#01Oct 22, 2026
cs.LG
Cost-Aware Abstention for LLM-Based IT Ticket Classification
Sachin Gupta
Wrong automatic routing of an IT support ticket can cost more than human triage. We evaluate cost-aware abstention as an offline, cost-conditional readiness assessment: select a routing policy on calibration data under explicit costs, then evaluate that frozen policy once on held-out test data. On a public 47,837-ticket, eight-class corpus, we compare four trained non-LLM classifiers with four large language models under zero- and few-shot prompting. Under the illustrative cost model (c_ok, c_triage, c_wrong) = (0, 1, 5), TF-IDF with logistic regression and a threshold of 0.60 selected on calibration reduces test cost from 0.763 to 0.472, a 38.1% relative reduction (paired ratio-bootstrap 95% CI [35.7%, 40.4%]), while lowering wrong routes from 15.3% to 3.5%. Frozen calibration-selected policies also beat both always-route and always-defer on held-out test data in 14 of 16 settings in a post-hoc cost-parameter analysis. The strongest prompted configuration reaches 0.477 accuracy on a stratified 1,000-ticket test subset, versus 0.879 for fine-tuned DistilBERT on the same tickets. Isotonic lowers expected calibration error without reliably improving discrimination: GPT-4o-mini few-shot has one confidence value before and after recalibration and correctness AUROC 0.500. We therefore report correctness AUROC and tie-aware risk-coverage area alongside ECE. At the analytically derived break-even probability 0.80, seven prompted configurations defer all tickets; Haiku few-shot routes only 19/1,000. An LLM-only agreement control and margin/entropy rejection baselines further separate calibration from discrimination. The findings are scoped to this dataset, prompt design, model endpoints, and illustrative costs; the work is an evaluation framework, not a new abstention algorithm or universal deployment certification.
#02Oct 22, 2026
cs.LG
Diffusion Language Models for Perplexity-Aware Black-Box Attacks
Ali Al-Lawati, Elsayed Eshra, Dongwon Lee and 1 more
\emph{Continuous-space} attacks find prompts that trigger malicious behaviors, such as overthinking, in black-box LLMs by sampling or optimizing over a low-dimensional Gaussian latent space and decoding it to text through a \emph{random mapping} and nearest-token lookup. Because the random mapping is not learned from language, its prompts can be highly unnatural, and as such easily detectable through input guardrails, and the risk estimates they yield are not grounded in natural prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate that the same continuous latent-space framework can be coupled directly to a learned generative distribution over language, a continuous diffusion language model (dLLM), which removes the artificial random mapping while preserving the standard-Gaussian latent formulation and the downstream sampling or optimization procedure. We evaluate this approach under two settings: sampling-based estimation using \emph{RareTrap} and optimization-based search using \emph{ThinkTrap}. We find that character-level perplexity drops from $10^3$--$10^7$ to 3--5 in RareTrap and from 20--28 to 4.3--5.4 in ThinkTrap. We also find that model risk estimates can differ by an order of magnitude across the two mappings.
#03Oct 22, 2026
cs.AI
Who Is Sycophantic to Whom? Confident LLMs, Human Deference, and the Collapse of Trust Calibration
Deepthika S, Pawni Yadav, B. Sankar
Research on sycophancy asks whether large language models (LLMs) bend towards what their users want to hear. We ask the reverse question: when an LLM is confident, consistent, and wrong, do users bend towards it? In a within-subjects experiment, 32 participants learned up to five science topics by chatting with five assistants built on the same model (GPT-5-mini). Unknown to participants, each assistant's briefing had 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100% of its facts replaced by plausible falsehoods, and every assistant spoke with full confidence. A surprise quiz after each topic offered the correct fact, the planted falsehood, and two distractors, with a confidence rating for every answer. Across 104 quizzes and 1,040 answers, scores fell from 7.4 to 2.9 out of 10, and the planted option was chosen on 60% of falsified items against 11% of correctly taught ones (odds ratio 12.5). Transcript coding showed that whenever the assistant stated a falsehood, it was adopted about 65% of the time at every falsification level. Absorbed falsehoods were held with high confidence (8.4/10), the modeled confidence advantage of right over wrong answers vanished, and the discrimination of confidence for correctness fell from an AUROC of 0.70 to chance, while post-task trust ratings barely moved. Participants tended to return to the chat more when the assistant was worse, but returning went with more absorption, not less, and 30% of all turns pasted quiz questions back to the source being checked. The assistant itself was almost never sycophantic and never conceded under pushback. We introduce a baseline-corrected Human Deference Index to quantify this human-side sycophancy and argue that trustworthiness is a property of the human-AI pair, that sycophancy evaluations should measure both directions, and that learning interfaces must make reliability legible claim by claim.
#04Oct 22, 2026
stat.ML
Reliable AI-Assisted Decisions via Selective Auditing
Isaac Gibbs, Elise L. Han, Ryan J. Tibshirani and 1 more
We consider online monitoring of an AI system that produces a sequence of decisions. At each round, the system outputs a proposed decision together with a confidence score estimating the trustworthiness of the decision. The decision and confidence score need not be produced by the same model: for example, one agent may propose a decision, while a separate verifier agent evaluates it and outputs a correctness or safety score. Based on this information, we must decide whether to accept the AI decision automatically or consult an expert, such as a human auditor, who reviews the proposal and either accepts or corrects it. We formulate this task as an online constrained optimization problem in which the goal is to minimize the frequency of expert auditing while guaranteeing that the fraction of AI errors that go unaudited stays below a user-defined threshold. We derive a family of algorithms with provable error-control guarantees with no assumptions, including a method that is optimally efficient: it asymptotically attains the best achievable auditing rate for both adversarial and i.i.d. data streams. Experiments on screening harmful requests to large language models, qualitative text annotation, and data labeling show that our methods achieve valid error control in practice while substantially reducing the need for human auditing compared to baselines.
#05Oct 22, 2026
cs.LG
OP-Print: Tracing Membership Imprints in On-Policy Self-Distillation
Qi Li, Xinchao Wang
On-policy distillation has been widely adopted for alleviating the distribution mismatch of off-policy distillation. Self-distillation further removes the need for an external teacher by using the student's own outputs, enhanced with extra context or demonstrations, as supervision. This teacher-free design makes on-policy self-distillation practical, yet its privacy risks remain largely unexplored. In particular, using two coupled views of the same training example may strengthen its memorization. Motivated by this, we present the first study of membership inference attacks against on-policy self-distillation. We investigate both gray-box and black-box threat models and propose a unified attack framework, named OP-Print. OP-Print builds on our finding that the supervision imprint in on-policy self-distillation is sparse and structured, concentrating on uncertainty-sensitive correction sites rather than across the entire rollout. Exploiting this property, we construct attack signals tailored to the two access levels: in the gray-box setting, OP-Print directly aggregates the privileged teacher-student residual correction along the same rollout; in the black-box setting, it measures restart-based output-basin stability as an observable surrogate for the hidden correction process. Across diverse models and distillation schemes, all baseline attacks remain essentially at random guessing even under gray-box access, whereas OP-Print is broadly validated to be effective in both gray-box and black-box settings.