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5 papers

#01Oct 22, 2026

stat.ML

Reliable AI-Assisted Decisions via Selective Auditing

Isaac Gibbs, Elise L. Han, Ryan J. Tibshirani and 1 more

We consider online monitoring of an AI system that produces a sequence of decisions. At each round, the system outputs a proposed decision together with a confidence score estimating the trustworthiness of the decision. The decision and confidence score need not be produced by the same model: for example, one agent may propose a decision, while a separate verifier agent evaluates it and outputs a correctness or safety score. Based on this information, we must decide whether to accept the AI decision automatically or consult an expert, such as a human auditor, who reviews the proposal and either accepts or corrects it. We formulate this task as an online constrained optimization problem in which the goal is to minimize the frequency of expert auditing while guaranteeing that the fraction of AI errors that go unaudited stays below a user-defined threshold. We derive a family of algorithms with provable error-control guarantees with no assumptions, including a method that is optimally efficient: it asymptotically attains the best achievable auditing rate for both adversarial and i.i.d. data streams. Experiments on screening harmful requests to large language models, qualitative text annotation, and data labeling show that our methods achieve valid error control in practice while substantially reducing the need for human auditing compared to baselines.

#02Oct 22, 2026

cs.LG

Efficient and Optimal Learning of Discrete Distributions with Person-Level Privacy

Gautam Kamath, Mahbod Majid, Ankur Moitra and 2 more

We study learning a discrete distribution under person-level differential privacy in the batched setting. Given $n$ users, each contributing $m$ i.i.d. samples from an unknown distribution $μ$ over $[k]$, we seek an estimate of $μ$ with total-variation error $α$. We give polynomial-time algorithms under both pure and approximate differential privacy. Under pure $(\varepsilon,0)$-DP, we achieve $n = \widetilde O(k/(α^2 m)+k/(α\sqrt{m}\varepsilon)+k/\varepsilon)$, the first polynomial-time pure-DP guarantee matching the information-theoretic optimum up to logarithmic factors. Under approximate $(\varepsilon,δ)$-DP, we achieve $n = \widetilde O(k/(α^2 m)+k/(α\sqrt{m}\varepsilon)+k+\log(1/δ)/\varepsilon)$. At $δ=2^{-Θ(k)}$, this is $\widetilde O(k)$ for fixed $α,\varepsilon,m$ and failure probability. Our algorithms use a new degree-6 sum-of-squares estimator for learning from untrusted batches. Its key ingredient is a trace-bounded diagonal majorizer for the difference between the empirical covariance of the repaired batch averages and the multinomial covariance predicted by their mean. We prove that clean data admit this certificate through semidefinite-programming duality and a new application of the stronger symmetric form of Grothendieck's inequality due to Friedland and Lim. The certificate preserves the mean-dependent variance of multinomial batch averages, yielding the near-optimal robust rate $O(η\sqrt{\log(1/η)/m})$ and providing the score required by the privacy reduction. We also prove a statistical query lower bound ruling out a uniformly smaller order of error under fixed polynomial SQ resource bounds.

#03Oct 22, 2026

cs.AI

Who Is Sycophantic to Whom? Confident LLMs, Human Deference, and the Collapse of Trust Calibration

Deepthika S, Pawni Yadav, B. Sankar

Research on sycophancy asks whether large language models (LLMs) bend towards what their users want to hear. We ask the reverse question: when an LLM is confident, consistent, and wrong, do users bend towards it? In a within-subjects experiment, 32 participants learned up to five science topics by chatting with five assistants built on the same model (GPT-5-mini). Unknown to participants, each assistant's briefing had 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100% of its facts replaced by plausible falsehoods, and every assistant spoke with full confidence. A surprise quiz after each topic offered the correct fact, the planted falsehood, and two distractors, with a confidence rating for every answer. Across 104 quizzes and 1,040 answers, scores fell from 7.4 to 2.9 out of 10, and the planted option was chosen on 60% of falsified items against 11% of correctly taught ones (odds ratio 12.5). Transcript coding showed that whenever the assistant stated a falsehood, it was adopted about 65% of the time at every falsification level. Absorbed falsehoods were held with high confidence (8.4/10), the modeled confidence advantage of right over wrong answers vanished, and the discrimination of confidence for correctness fell from an AUROC of 0.70 to chance, while post-task trust ratings barely moved. Participants tended to return to the chat more when the assistant was worse, but returning went with more absorption, not less, and 30% of all turns pasted quiz questions back to the source being checked. The assistant itself was almost never sycophantic and never conceded under pushback. We introduce a baseline-corrected Human Deference Index to quantify this human-side sycophancy and argue that trustworthiness is a property of the human-AI pair, that sycophancy evaluations should measure both directions, and that learning interfaces must make reliability legible claim by claim.

#04Oct 22, 2026

cs.CL

Would an LLM Match into a Residency? Uncertainty, Reasoning and Image Use of Open Language Models on the Spanish MIR Examination

Miguel Fernandez-de-Retana, Unai Zulaika, Ruben Sanchez-Corcuera and 2 more

Accuracy on medical examinations is common evidence offered for the clinical use of language models, yet a health system that intends to run an open model on its own hardware needs to know considerably more: whether the model recognizes when it is likely to be wrong, whether medical fine-tuning improves this ability, whether its correct answers rest on sound clinical reasoning, or whether it actually uses the images it is given. We examine these questions for four open models of 8 to 27 billion parameters on the Spanish MIR residency examination, scoring 1,552 questions from eight editions under the exam's own rules. Answering every question, the three larger models would rank among roughly the first 600 to 3,000 candidates, with 41 to 43 specialties still open to them. Abstention, however, never pays, because even their least confident answers are right more often than the 25% break-even. Medical fine-tuning reduced overconfidence at the cost of accuracy, without improving how well confidence separates right from wrong answers. Moreover, 13-38% of correct answers rejected a distractor for a clinically unsound reason that confidence did not reflect, and removing or swapping the provided contextual images left accuracy unchanged.

#05Oct 22, 2026

cs.AI

EpiSEM-Bench: Evaluating Safety and Evidence Recovery in LLM Agents under Missing Evidence

Qijin Zhang, Hanzhen Wang, Yuehan Zhao and 4 more

Tool-using language model agents rely on environmental facts to decide whether an action is permitted. When a tool response omits a safety-relevant fact, an agent may carry out a prohibited action even though the user request is benign and every returned statement is true. We introduce \bench{}, an executable benchmark for evaluating unsafe execution, safety boundaries, and evidence recovery in LLM agents under missing evidence. It contains 300 matched unsafe/safe task pairs across six domains. By systematically suppressing critical facts, the benchmark measures unsafe execution under critical evidence omission and determines the minimum observed failure cardinality, including failures with full evidence and cases with no observed failure after exhaustive testing. An independent audit tool tests whether agents seek missing facts and then withhold prohibited actions while completing permissible tasks. The benchmark reveals substantial variation across the ten models in omission robustness, evidence acquisition, and appropriate action. Resistance to missing evidence does not necessarily translate into useful recovery. Recovery access reduces unsafe execution for all ten models, but agents differ in whether they actively obtain the missing facts and use them to act appropriately in both worlds.