#01Nov 5, 2026
cs.LG
Unpacking the Compute Efficiency of Strong-to-Weak OPD against GRPO
Zeyu Leo Liu, Yang Li, Bo Pang and 7 more
On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student on its own rollouts under a frozen teacher's per-token supervision. Does this dense signal reduce the training FLOPs needed to reach a target accuracy compared with reinforcement learning? We systematically compare vanilla reverse-KL OPD with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) across task difficulty, student and teacher size, domain, and optimization choices, measuring held-out accuracy against training FLOPs. With an external post-trained teacher, OPD generally loses to GRPO in accuracy per training FLOP at matched settings, even when the teacher is further trained with GRPO, and often suffers response-length inflation. Yet a different teacher changes the picture: when the teacher is the student's own GRPO checkpoint, OPD recovers that checkpoint's accuracy on math with $50\times$ fewer distillation FLOPs than GRPO needs to reach the same accuracy. Following the same teacher setting, we consistently observe this high efficiency with a larger student, on code, and in a second model family. On a single domain, however, the GRPO checkpoint is already the desired model, so distilling it adds to total compute. Across domains, separate GRPO checkpoints hold different capabilities, and no single checkpoint serves every domain. Multi-teacher OPD (DeepSeek-AI, 2026) consolidates per-domain GRPO experts into a single student that matches each expert's accuracy, with the distillation stage costing only 5.2% (on 2 domains) and 8.0% (on 4 domains) of the specialist training FLOPs. Counting specialist training and distillation together, this pipeline reaches joint GRPO's performance on the 2-domain mix with 42.0% fewer total FLOPs.
#02Nov 5, 2026
cs.CL
Understanding AI from the Inside: The State of Mechanistic Interpretability for AI Safety
Fazl Barez, Tung-Yu Wu, Hunar Batra and 24 more
Neural networks are likely to be among the most consequential artefacts in human history. As these systems become more capable and autonomous, their potential to cause societal harm also grows, making AI safety one of the defining challenges of our time. Yet we continue to build increasingly powerful systems without fully understanding how they work, how they will behave in unfamiliar situations, or how to reliably control them. Mechanistic interpretability offers a path towards understanding these systems by studying their internal representations and computations, with the aim of evaluating, predicting, and controlling behaviour. We survey mechanistic interpretability for AI safety in order to answer the question: Does understanding how models work actually make them safer? We place mechanistic interpretability in the broader context of interpretability research and compare its mechanistic evidence with behavioural evaluation. We introduce the foundations of mechanistic interpretability, including features, polysemanticity, transformer computation, and circuits, and survey methods for feature extraction and analysis, circuit discovery and causal verification, explaining intermediate representations in natural language, learning dynamics, and training-data attribution. Beyond surveying existing methods, we propose a unified framework for evaluating mechanistic interpretability claims and characterise six research orientations by their goals, assumptions, and trade-offs. Finally, we examine how mechanistic understanding can support AI safety, including knowledge editing, steering, and monitoring, and assess its limitations, failure modes, open problems, and relationship to behavioural safety measures. We also release a repository of code notebooks with worked examples that reproduce key findings from surveyed methods, allowing readers to build intuition through hands-on experimentation.
#03Nov 5, 2026
cs.LG
A Hidden Markov Preference Model for Online Prediction of Adversary Actions
Angel Daruna, Michael Cogswell, Tixiao Shan and 3 more
A defender anticipating an attacker needs a probability distribution over the attacker's next action from information available before that action occurs. Two structures complicate this: the attacker's behavioral regime persists and can switch within an episode, and each action combines an operation with state-dependent arguments whose feasible values change over time. We capture both with a hidden Markov model whose latent state is the active regime and whose regime-conditioned action law is defined on a feasibility-masked tree of executable actions. The same likelihood forms the next-action distribution and updates the regime belief once the action is seen, and a partially observed prefix contributes its resolved local factors. Estimation separates into convex logistic fits that Baum-Welch reuses when regimes are unlabeled. We derive a reach-weighted nodewise KL expression for regime information, a sequence-wise log-loss bound for switching regime paths, and a uniform fallback guarantee. On the CAGE 2 cyber defense benchmark the filtered latent state is worth 0.8 nats per step, and after a controller switch the loss begins to fall in three steps against ten for a recurrent baseline.
#04Nov 5, 2026
cs.LG
XStack: A Benchmark for ML Repo Migration
Linrong Cai, Taiming Lu, Haozhe Chen and 1 more
ML code should run where researchers choose, not where it was first written. Today, machine learning code mainly lives in two ecosystems, PyTorch on NVIDIA GPUs and JAX on Google TPUs. Migrating repositories between them means building and testing across frameworks and hardware. This migration is (1) a practical need, since it unlocks different hardware for researchers, and (2) a natural benchmark: it involves different frameworks and hardware, covers whole repositories, and is long-horizon and challenging. We introduce XStack, a benchmark that evaluates agents on migrating ML repositories between these two ecosystems. Each agent receives a PyTorch repository and a clean TPU machine and must deliver a JAX repository. Its output passes if it meets our grading criteria, based on the source repository's published result, authenticated and calibrated by us. Migration by agents remains unreliable: Claude Opus 5 passes 75%, GPT-5.6-sol 45%, and every other agent at most 40%. XStack is a step toward freeing ML code from its ecosystem. We release XStack to make progress toward reliable migration across frameworks and hardware measurable.
#05Nov 5, 2026
cs.LG
On the limitations of molecular representations
Acer Blake, Fergus Imrie, Charlotte M. Deane
Molecular representations such as fingerprints and learned embeddings play a central role in cheminformatics and small-molecule machine learning. They serve as the primary input for a diverse array of tasks, including clustering, dataset splitting, and virtual screening, yet their evaluation is often limited to downstream model performance on narrow benchmark tasks. We carried out a systematic investigation of the quality of molecular representations, finding that none of the state-of-the-art molecular embedding models capture graph structure, 3D shape, or ADMET endpoint similarity better than fingerprints or physicochemical descriptors. However, classical fingerprints also revealed their own material limitations. For example, we show that depending on the representation, between 225M and $\sim$4B molecules have non-unique representations in the 10.8B Enamine REAL database, with implications for virtual screening. Our findings provide an insight into the current limitations of molecular representations, outlining future research directions for the development of more robust encodings of small molecules.