#01Jul 21, 2026
cs.CV
Appearance Pointers -- Multimodal Region Control of Diffusion Transformers
Rahul Sajnani, Yulia Gryaditskaya, Radomír Měch and 2 more
Controllable image generation remains challenging for creative professionals, who often require precise regional control over materials, object identities, and spatial arrangements that cannot be reliably achieved through text prompting alone. Diffusion Transformers (DiTs) can natively ingest heterogeneous tokens stemming from texts and images, but they lack mechanisms for determining where and how these tokens should influence the output. We introduce appearance pointers, compact tokens that guide DiTs toward the correct appearance cues at the correct spatial locations by aligning text or image inputs with user-specified masks. Appearance pointers are produced by a region correspondence network and refined through a spatial aggregation mechanism, enabling the model to handle multiple regional descriptions without significantly increasing token load. Our approach introduces the first modality-agnostic interface for localized multimodal control in a DiT without retraining the base model from scratch. Across a range of metrics, our single model reaches or surpasses the performance of modality-specific state of the art methods, offering a simple and extensible path toward precise, region-aware, multimodal guidance in generative image synthesis.
#02Jul 21, 2026
cs.CV
PathAgentBench: Benchmarking Evidence-Seeking Vision-Language Models on Whole-Slide Pathology Image
Dankai Liao, Tianyi Zhang, Yufeng Wu and 6 more
Whole-slide image (WSI) diagnosis requires identifying diagnostically relevant regions, examining them across magnifications, and integrating multi-scale evidence. However, most existing pathology benchmarks evaluate models on pre-cropped patches or pre-extracted slide features, leaving their ability to acquire evidence directly from gigapixel WSIs largely untested. We introduce PathAgentBench, a benchmark for evaluating evidence-seeking vision-language models (VLMs) across four complementary capabilities: image-to-text matching for evidence interpretation, text-to-image retrieval for evidence verification, diagnostic-region localization for evidence acquisition, and multi-scale reasoning for evidence integration. The benchmark is organized as a diagnostic tree that links nested regions across magnifications with scale-specific findings and path-level diagnoses. It contains 1,822 TCGA WSIs and 17,135 diagnostic paths annotated by ten board-certified pathologists. An additional private cohort of 190 breast cancer WSIs with detailed annotations is used to evaluate autonomous whole-slide exploration. We evaluate 20 general-purpose, medical, and pathology-specialized models. Leading open-weight models achieve over 93% accuracy in multi-scale reasoning and over 50% accuracy in both cross-modal matching tasks. In contrast, diagnostic-region localization remains challenging: the best text-guided mean intersection-over-union is below 0.09, underperforming a simple center-based heuristic. During autonomous exploration, the unconditional hit rate decreases from 0.522 at low magnification to 0.185 at intermediate magnification and 0.020 at high magnification. These results reveal a pronounced gap between reasoning over curated evidence and acquiring that evidence directly from WSIs. PathAgentBench provides a unified framework for measuring and improving evidence-seeking pathology models.
#03Jul 21, 2026
cs.LG
Staypoint Detection from Noisy Trajectory Data [Experiment Paper]
Lance Kennedy, Hossein Amiri, Yueyang Liu and 9 more
Detecting staypoints from raw trajectory data is fundamental to numerous spatial computing applications. This process transforms raw numeric sequences of geolocations into semantically meaningful locations, such as homes, workplaces, or restaurants. Despite its importance for semantic trajectory analysis, staypoint detection lacks standard benchmarks, and existing algorithms have never been systematically evaluated. This gap persists because no publicly available datasets provide both raw individual trajectories and ground-truth staypoint annotations. This benchmark paper addresses this limitation with two key contributions: (1) we introduce 16 large-scale simulated datasets capturing thousands of agents with annotated staypoints across varying trajectory noise levels, and (2) we evaluate nine staypoint detection algorithms-including both state-of-the-art and novel methods-to analyze their robustness to noise. Our evaluation reveals that existing state-of-the-art algorithms perform poorly under realistic noise conditions. Conversely, our proposed unsupervised methods yield substantial improvements, while supervised approaches drastically outperform existing baselines. While these results are very promising, these datasets and methods are only meant as starting points for future research in staypoint detection.
#04Jul 21, 2026
cs.CR
They'll Verify. They Just Won't Act. How Authority Framing and Laundered Code Turn a Trusted Agentic CI/CD Pipeline Into an Attack Surface
Yohann Sidot
We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.
#05Jul 21, 2026
cs.CY
The safety failures we are not instrumenting: a perspective on hidden safety-critical challenges in modern AI systems
Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci
Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios. That focus is incomplete. In deployed systems, many of the most consequential failures are quieter: plausible rather than spectacular, distributed across components rather than localized in a single output, and normalized by workflows before they are recognized as hazards. We argue that a central safety challenge in modern AI systems is increasingly not only whether a model emits a harmful response, but whether the broader socio-technical system preserves the conditions under which errors remain visible, contestable, containable, and recoverable. We propose a five-layer framework for diagnosing these hidden risks: (1) epistemic integrity, concerning whether evidence and uncertainty are represented honestly enough to support calibrated reliance; (2) control integrity, concerning whether authority, permissions, and action boundaries remain robust under attack and optimization; (3) temporal integrity, concerning whether safety holds across sessions, memory updates, and deployment drift; (4) organizational integrity, concerning whether institutions retain the capacity to audit, assign responsibility, and intervene effectively; and (5) ecosystem integrity, concerning whether AI systems preserve rather than erode the information environment on which future oversight depends. Across these layers, we identify under-recognized risk patterns, including overreliance, uncertainty and legitimacy laundering in retrieval, prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, evaluation deception, fictional human oversight, synthetic evidence pollution, and model collapse. We conclude with design and governance recommendations and a research agenda for shifting AI safety from model-centric evaluation toward socio-technical reliability.