#01Oct 26, 2026
cs.CR
Atomic Security Concerns: Towards a Foundational Language for Security Knowledge Representation
Hanane Houmani
Cybersecurity governance, risk management, compliance, and security architecture rely on numerous concepts, including security properties, domains, controls, risks, implementation measures, capabilities, and compliance requirements. Although these concepts are widely used, they are often represented through heterogeneous abstractions and vocabularies, making relationships among them difficult to express consistently and leaving much of the associated reasoning dependent on expert knowledge. This paper introduces the concepts of Security Concerns and Atomic Security Concerns (ASCs) and explores the hypothesis that cybersecurity knowledge may be represented through a finite set of foundational concerns. Inspired by the role of atoms in chemistry, the proposed approach views cybersecurity concepts as compositions of more fundamental concerns rather than as independent abstractions. Hence, Atomic Security Concerns could be viewed as a common abstraction layer for the representation of cybersecurity concepts, independently of their domain, nature, or level of granularity. Building upon this perspective, the paper explores how Atomic Security Concerns may provide the vocabulary of a cybersecurity language and how cybersecurity concepts may be represented as concern sets supporting explicit relationships among concepts. The contribution of this work is intentionally conceptual: it introduces a framework and research hypothesis for investigating the foundations of a common language for cybersecurity knowledge representation, reasoning, and future formalization.
#02Oct 26, 2026
cs.LG
MiRL: Error-Targeted Reinforcement Learning for Correcting Terminal Agent Misbehaviors
Runchu Tian, Zaid Khan, Zun Wang and 2 more
Error-targeted learning gives a legible way to improve a model: identify specific weaknesses of the model, train the model to fix these weaknesses, and check whether the weaknesses are fixed. We study how to apply error-targeted learning to terminal agents, which solve long-horizon tasks specified in natural language by interacting with a command shell. Existing error-targeted methods are designed for single-turn tasks, and existing analyses of agent failures are used to evaluate and debug agents rather than to train them. We propose Misbehavior-driven RL (MiRL), which first profiles the errors of a policy to find generalizable misbehaviors: kinds of wrong steps that recur across many environments. MiRL then trains the policy with RL, starting rollouts at the steps where these misbehaviors occur and rewarding a rollout only if it passes the tests and avoids the misbehavior. On Qwen3.5-4B, eight misbehaviors account for 52.1% of wrong steps. After training with MiRL, the policy repeats the measured misbehaviors 43% to 57% less often on average on unseen prefixes. MiRL outperforms TMax-4B on Terminal-Bench Lite (51.8% vs. 47.4%) and matches it on Terminal-Bench 2.1 (21.3% vs. 20.6%), while using 35% of its rollouts. These results show that error-targeted learning can be applied to realistic, long-horizon terminal tasks.
#03Oct 26, 2026
cs.LG
Audit Where Hacks Pay: Budgeted Strong-Verifier Audits Against Reward Hacking in GRPO
Shurun Li, Michael Hua Wang, Haibo Zeng and 1 more
Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards trains on cheap checks, such as unit tests, that a policy can learn to game, while a stronger check is too expensive to run on every rollout. We study how to spend a limited strong-verifier budget in GRPO, separating which weakly passing rollouts to audit from what reward a caught hack receives. At a fixed policy state with centered advantages, the expected update depends on a design only through each rollout's marginal audit probability and correction; reflecting a caught hack's reward about the failure reward negates the advantages of an all-hack group; and auditing whole groups with the fewest weak passes first (low-pass budgeted audits, LB) minimizes the advantage mass left on hacks among pass-count designs with a fixed correction when a label's value falls with the pass count. We tested this analysis in actual LLM training: from each run's starting state, the sign of this mass on a frozen panel predicted whether hacking would be suppressed in 33 of 39 runs, including 13 of 16 preregistered ones. In LeetCode (Wong et al., 2026) and Countdown-Code (Khalifa et al., 2026), LB drives hacking to near zero, while random audits with the same penalty and budget do not and use more labels. We also find that the randomness of the update affects training: in Countdown-Code, two unbiased corrections, per-item reward-level IPW and a group-level advantage correction, bring hacking down too but end 6.1-11.8 and 8.0-11.5 points lower in held-out accuracy than LB at the same budget. A full audit, which the group-level correction reproduces in expectation, stays within about two points of LB in three seeds, while LB uses 28% of its labels, and allocating the same correction by pass count recovers most of the loss (one seed). Training outcomes thus depend not only on the expected update but also on the randomness of its estimate.
#04Oct 26, 2026
cs.CL
SEMA-Auto: Sighted and Efficient Multi-Turn Attack with Autonomy
Mingqian Feng, Xiaodong Liu, Weiwei Yang and 7 more
Existing jailbreak attackers fall into two classes: static planners fix their single- or multi-turn adversarial plans in advance, remaining simple but losing sight of the victim's replies, wasting turns and limiting transferability; interactive generators read each victim reply to generate the next-turn attack but require in-loop evaluators for success signals or hints, incurring substantial costs and inflated performance. Bridging this gap, we propose SEMA-Auto, a sighted and efficient multi-turn attacker with autonomy, interacting with the victim model and terminating the session by itself upon success. To stabilize its behaviors and boost its capabilities, SEMA-Auto is trained in two stages. Synthetic bootstrap tuning installs the notion of attack targets and conforming decisions by fine-tuning the base model with bootstrapped trajectories. Decision-supervised reinforcement learning then optimizes two objectives jointly yet separately, reinforcing the attack with higher jailbreak reward while supervising the decision at each turn against an absolute target. Our method achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) attack success rates (ASR) across multiple datasets, victims, and judges, outperforming all static and interactive baselines, within almost the fewest turns, demonstrating both effectiveness and efficiency. For example, SEMA-Auto performs a $76.0\%$ ASR@1 within an average of $3.0$ turns against DeepSeek-V4-Flash on AdvBench, while the best static baseline is $54.8\%$ with fixed $7$ turns and the best interactive baseline is $43.8\%$ in $3.7$ turns. Against safety-hardened frontier models, GPT-oss-120B, GPT-5.4, Claude-Haiku-4.5, and GPT-6-Astra, our counter-trained attacker achieves an average $59.6\%$ ASR@1 on HarmBench, $13.8\%$ over prior SOTA. Our code is available at: https://github.com/microsoft/SEMA
#05Oct 26, 2026
cs.AI
Retriever-Free Retrieval: Navigating Documents with Decision Models
Chao Wan, Paul Jünger, Beixi Du and 3 more
While language models have become dramatically more capable, retrieval still largely relies on lexical matching or similarity in fixed embedding spaces. This creates a capability asymmetry: what the retriever fails to find, even the strongest generator cannot recover. We propose DecisionRAG, which brings the capabilities of pretrained language models to retrieval using decision models that jointly evaluate candidate branches in a single forward pass, without generating any tokens, and show that judging candidates in a shared context makes their relevance estimates comparable. Like a person browsing a library, DecisionRAG navigates the corpus's inherent structure from broad topics down to individual passages, deciding at each level which branches are worth exploring. Without task-specific training or a first-stage retriever, DecisionRAG outperforms dense retrieval with an 8B reranker by 13.8 R@1 points on MultiDoc2Dial and 17.4 Hit@1 points on Natural Questions. Across four benchmarks, including a corpus of 2.68 million Wikipedia paragraphs, retrieval takes just 0.7-1.8 seconds per query.