#01Oct 22, 2026
cs.LG
Cost-Aware Abstention for LLM-Based IT Ticket Classification
Sachin Gupta
Wrong automatic routing of an IT support ticket can cost more than human triage. We evaluate cost-aware abstention as an offline, cost-conditional readiness assessment: select a routing policy on calibration data under explicit costs, then evaluate that frozen policy once on held-out test data. On a public 47,837-ticket, eight-class corpus, we compare four trained non-LLM classifiers with four large language models under zero- and few-shot prompting. Under the illustrative cost model (c_ok, c_triage, c_wrong) = (0, 1, 5), TF-IDF with logistic regression and a threshold of 0.60 selected on calibration reduces test cost from 0.763 to 0.472, a 38.1% relative reduction (paired ratio-bootstrap 95% CI [35.7%, 40.4%]), while lowering wrong routes from 15.3% to 3.5%. Frozen calibration-selected policies also beat both always-route and always-defer on held-out test data in 14 of 16 settings in a post-hoc cost-parameter analysis. The strongest prompted configuration reaches 0.477 accuracy on a stratified 1,000-ticket test subset, versus 0.879 for fine-tuned DistilBERT on the same tickets. Isotonic lowers expected calibration error without reliably improving discrimination: GPT-4o-mini few-shot has one confidence value before and after recalibration and correctness AUROC 0.500. We therefore report correctness AUROC and tie-aware risk-coverage area alongside ECE. At the analytically derived break-even probability 0.80, seven prompted configurations defer all tickets; Haiku few-shot routes only 19/1,000. An LLM-only agreement control and margin/entropy rejection baselines further separate calibration from discrimination. The findings are scoped to this dataset, prompt design, model endpoints, and illustrative costs; the work is an evaluation framework, not a new abstention algorithm or universal deployment certification.
#02Oct 22, 2026
cs.AI
DuoCook: An Overcooked-Inspired Benchmark for Visual Planning and Coordination
Ziyi Jiao, Heng Zhang, Drishti Regmi and 3 more
Coordinating two players in a cooking task requires a vision-language agent to track changing scene states, sequence recipe steps, and allocate shared resources under a time budget. We introduce an Overcooked-inspired benchmark for evaluating these capabilities in Unreal Engine environments constructed using coding agents. A single vision-language model controls both players from top-down visual observations, selecting high-level actions while the engine executes navigation. The benchmark contains 20 maps in five categories. These categories support evaluation of centralized coordination under equipment contention, changing terrain, and handoff dependencies. A prop legend and pot ingredient-count indicators provide explicit visual cues, while grid-based destinations support spatial grounding. The evaluation compares four VLMs on all 20 maps, measuring task score, order completion, delivery precision, action acceptance rate, and model API expenditure. A memory ablation on the same 20 maps examines the effect of a shared, self-authored notebook while retaining six-response action history in both conditions. The strongest evaluated model, \texttt{gpt-6-astra}, achieves 26.2\% mean order completion. Notebook memory has mixed score effects across models, with positive mean differences for Claude and Qwen and negative differences for GPT and Gemini.
#03Oct 22, 2026
cs.CL
Can an Agent Debug a Web Corpus? Agentic Auditing of Slovak FineWeb2
Marek Šuppa, Ivan Vykopal, Jaroslav Kopčan
Multilingual pipelines such as FineWeb2 apply one recipe across a thousand languages, leaving the failure modes of individual languages unanticipated. We use an LLM once, as a corpus debugger rather than a classifier: a tool-using agent explores the corpus through a read-only, budgeted API and compiles each finding into an executable test, which a native speaker then validates. On the 26.5M-document Slovak portion of FineWeb2, three runs costing \$2.21-\$2.84 each found seven findings over four phenomena. The largest is a machine-generated content farm of 1,408,437 documents (5.32%) that passed the pipeline's filters, 86.6% of it passing even stricter thresholds. Blinded labels support 6 of the 7 findings (defect rates .53-1.00 against .08 in a random control) and do not support one. The compiled suite scans the full corpus in 0.7 s of wall-clock time without a GPU, against \$12k-\$90k per LLM classification pass. The best static sampling baseline validates more selectors than any agent run, at under half the cost. The agent contributes exact prevalence, a precision estimate checked against sampled documents, an account of why the pipeline missed each slice, and a reusable test. We release the framework, Slovak test suite, validation data and agent trajectories.
#04Oct 22, 2026
cs.CR
Social-HUMINT: An LLM-Augmented Unified Framework for Measuring Social Media Exposure
Pellegrino Casoria, Simon Pietro Romano
In the post-API landscape, social-media profiling has become inexpensive and automated: Large Language Models (LLMs) can extract structured information from unstructured content and deduce attributes users never disclosed. A person's true exposure is not what they post but what can be inferred from it. As these practices become routine, exposure to social engineering attacks becomes an operational certainty, demanding a shared framework for assessment and mitigation. We make this exposure measurable by quantifying how accurately a target can be profiled, and how far that profile enables social engineering attacks. Because no existing model fully spans this continuum, we unify Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) and Cyber Human Intelligence (Cyber-HUMINT), two individual-focused disciplines that evolved separately, into a single doctrine-grounded taxonomy of 38 capabilities across the Cyber Threat Intelligence lifecycle, where user profiling bridges passive collection and active engagement. Domain experts validated the taxonomy (Fleiss' $κ$ = 0.92). We operationalize its core path (extraction, inference, and susceptibility assessment) as an LLM-augmented multi-agent pipeline, evaluated on real participants' public data. Susceptibility is assessed indirectly: the pipeline predicts how each target would rank personalized engagement options, matching their actual choices significantly above chance. This ranking capacity captures the personalization on which tailored attacks depend. The underlying profiles are accurate: extraction reaches F1 = 97.3%, and inferred attributes score 4.73/5, both far above rule-based and NER-based baselines at negligible cost. The framework augments security analysts' tradecraft rather than replacing it and enables defenders to gauge their own exposure before an adversary does.
#05Oct 22, 2026
cs.LG
Diffusion Language Models for Perplexity-Aware Black-Box Attacks
Ali Al-Lawati, Elsayed Eshra, Dongwon Lee and 1 more
\emph{Continuous-space} attacks find prompts that trigger malicious behaviors, such as overthinking, in black-box LLMs by sampling or optimizing over a low-dimensional Gaussian latent space and decoding it to text through a \emph{random mapping} and nearest-token lookup. Because the random mapping is not learned from language, its prompts can be highly unnatural, and as such easily detectable through input guardrails, and the risk estimates they yield are not grounded in natural prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate that the same continuous latent-space framework can be coupled directly to a learned generative distribution over language, a continuous diffusion language model (dLLM), which removes the artificial random mapping while preserving the standard-Gaussian latent formulation and the downstream sampling or optimization procedure. We evaluate this approach under two settings: sampling-based estimation using \emph{RareTrap} and optimization-based search using \emph{ThinkTrap}. We find that character-level perplexity drops from $10^3$--$10^7$ to 3--5 in RareTrap and from 20--28 to 4.3--5.4 in ThinkTrap. We also find that model risk estimates can differ by an order of magnitude across the two mappings.